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Choice of Law under Section 1983
Section 1983, 42 U.S.C., 1 provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Many issues which arise in cases brought pursuant to this brief statute
are unresolved by its terms. The question whether to refer to state or
federal law to formulate rules of decision for these unresolved issues is
the choice of law problem with which this comment is concerned. For
some matters the proper choice is clear; for example, the definition of
the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws" of the United States is a matter for federal law.2 For other issues,
for example the use of state statutes of limitations, the practice of
applying state law is well settled. Between these extremes there are
several issues which arise under section 1983 which merit analysis to
determine whether state or federal law, or some combination, should
govern. These issues are the defenses available under section 1983,
measure of damages, and survival of actions.
The choice of law for resolution of each of these issues has received
little attention from the courts.3 There are few cases involving a direct
conflict between a state law rule and a federal section 1983 rule4 be-
cause the latter body of law is not extensive.5 More frequently courts
1 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 18) (known as "the Ku Klux Klan Act," or "the Third Civil Rights Act').
2 Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
3 The Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the problem. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 187 (1961), said that "[§ 1983] should be read against the background of tort
liability . ... " Whether this was addressed to choice of law at all is open to question.
See text at note 65 infra. If it was meant to speak to choice questions it has the effect of
removing any restrictions upon the source of authorities that a court may rely on.
4 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), involved a direct conflict between a state law
defense, adopted by the court below, of plaintiff's consent to the injury and the rules of
defense developed in the opinion. See text at note 68 infra.
5 To date the majority of cases under § 1983 have dealt with the threshold con-
sideration-what interpretation to give the terms of the section. Monroe v. Pape, 365
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are faced with a gap in section 1983 law which must be filled either by
use of state law or formulation of new section 1983 law. By one method
or the other, courts generally achieve an outcome consistent with the
developing pattern of section 1983 decisions. Uncertainty remains how-
ever about the use of federal law from other areas of federal jurisdic-
tion,6 the role of state law,7 and the development of new federal law. 8
Many opinions ignore these choice of law issues and base their decision
on any, or all, of the sources of law which provide the desired result.9
Congress has not left the federal courts without some guidance to
the relationships between state and federal law in the application of
section 1983. Section 198810 addresses itself to the problem of adequate
rules for decisions:
[Section 1983 and other civil rights laws] shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposi-
tion of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the in-
fliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
In short, the section provides that federal law shall control where "suit-
U.S. 167 (1961), settled many questions about the section's interpretation and breadth.
Increasingly, opinions deal with issues which arise after the plaintiff has brought himself
within the section's terms; these are the issues which raise the choice of law problem.
6 See Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312
(6th Cir. 1958); text at notes 16-31 infra.
7 See Lauderdale v. Smith, 186 F. Supp. 958 (D.C. Ark. 1960) (court felt that it must
use federal law under § 1983); text at notes 32-62 infra.
8 Text at notes 63-86 infra.
9 See, e.g., Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1957). This court held a judge im-
mune from suit, citing seventeen cases to support the proposition including decisions from
federal circuit and district courts, and supreme courts of other states. The court in Egan
v. City of Aurora, 174 F. Supp. 794, 799 (N.D. II. 1959), surveyed courts' performance on
this point and concluded that ". . . the federal courts have declared on the basis of
general law . . . or on a basis of state law . ., that the Civil Rights Acts were not in-
tended to abrogate totally the common law immunities which attached to broad cate-
gories of legislative, judicial and even administrative officials." And a third basis, federal
law, can now be added since the Supreme Court's holding on judicial immunity in Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 US. 547, 554 (1966).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964).
The University of Chicago Law Review
able" and that state law shall be used to achieve the object of the statute
or to provide suitable remedies where the federal laws are deficient.-"
This section provides roughly the same pattern for choice of law
problems under federal statutes that has been suggested by academic
commentators:
Where federal matters are involved (1) specific language of
valid federal statutes will control when applicable; (2) where
federal statutes do not clearly articulate the law to be applied,
federal courts must fill the interstices; (3) federal courts can do
this by reference to federal or state law; (4) the choice here
depends on a number of different factors.' 2
The factors the authors deem relevant for making the proper choice
are the purposes of the particular federal enactment.13
Both these solutions for choice of law questions rely on the purposes
of the statute to provide a guide. In Monroe v. Pape14 the Supreme
Court set out the four purposes it saw for section 1983: 1) to override
unconstitutional state laws, 2) to provide remedies where state laws
are deficient, 3) to provide remedies which are technically, but not
practically available under state law, and 4) to provide remedies sub-
stantially equivalent to those practically available in state court.15 It
is disappointing that these purposes are of little aid in resolving the
choice of law problem, since section 1988 and the commentators' state-
ments of the solution intimate that once the purposes of a federal
enactment are identified, the applicable law would become apparent.
Perhaps this is being unfair to Monroe, or to the choice of law solu-
tions, or all three, since the issues which demand choice analysis are
restricted to the few identified. But the fact remains that the purposes
as stated in Monroe do not lead to conclusions that a state statute of
limitations applies or that a federal rule shall be formulated to measure
damages. Monroe's purposes can indicate which plaintiffs have rights
protected by section 1983; the issues which raise the choice of law prob-
lems arise after the plaintiff has shown his right. They govern the
remedy given to the plaintiff by answering the questions: "Has plain-
tiff delayed too long? Has he or the defendant died? Has the defendant
a defense? How much. money can the plaintiff recover?"
11 § 1983 provides a civil remedy and this comment confines itself to choice of law in
such actions. Therefore the provisions of § 1988 which apply to the criminal counterpart
of § 1983, 18 US.C. § 242 (1964), are not relevant.
12 IA MooRE's FEDmAL PaRArzcz [ 0.328, at 3901 (2d ed. 1968).
13 Id. 0.323, at 3759.
14 365 US. 167 (1961).
15 Id. at 173, 174, 183.
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To decide whether state or federal law shall govern each of these
questions, it is necessary to consider the policies which are served by
each choice. State law might be chosen because it provides a compre-
hensive, modem, and settled body of rules. Or it may be decided that
a federal rule should govern because the issue is so closely related to
the scope of the constitutional or federal right that it must be uni-
formly protected throughout the nation. This comment will examine
these considerations as applied to each issue and describe the pattern
for the resolution of the choice of law problems.
I. SECTION 1988 AND THE USE OF FEDERAL. LAW
Section 1988 plainly provides that federal laws shall govern section
1983 cases insofar as they are suitable to achieve the purpose of the act.
At the time of section 1988's passage in 1866,18 the term "federal laws"
did not encompass a large body of rules and the common law was a
fairly unitary set of precedents that were applied in all courts. In this
context section 1988 made federal law binding where it applied but
the great majority of factual situations would be resolved by the com-
mon law as announced largely by state courts and as modified by state
legislatures.
With the growth of federal powers and responsibilities the body of
federal law has increased dramatically. There is a large and diverse
accumulation of federal precedents. Pritchard v. Smith,17 a section 1983
case, suggests a few of the sources from which a federal rule might be
drawn: the admiralty jurisdiction,'8 the Federal Employers Liability
Act,19 and the Sherman Act.20 At least one section 1983 case relied
solely on an antitrust case as controlling precedent. 21 Other possible
'16 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
17 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
18 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. The federal courts dearly have the power to form a federal
common law in an area granted to them by the Constitution.
19 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1964). This act does not specifically treat the question of gov-
erning law; the federal courts have taken the position that a federal common law governs.
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). The federal courts have developed antitrust law in the
absence of other available rules of law.
:21 Lauderdale v. Smith, 186 F. Supp. 958 (D.C. Ark. 1960), arose from an alleged false
imprisonment. The defendant died and the district court ruled that survival should be
governed by federal common law, citing Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958), on
the choice of law problem. For the substantive rule the court turned to a case decided
under the Sherman Act. This case, Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n,
128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942), held that survival of an action under a federal statute was
governed by federal common law and that this law allowed survival of actions only for
injuries to property; actions for damages for injuries to the person abated upon the
death of either party. The Lauderdale court concluded that the § 1983 action, based
on an injury to the person, did not survive. Both the choice of law and substantive hold-
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sources of federal law include diversity cases which, prior to Erie v.
Tompkins,22 were decided according to a federal common law,23 cases
decided in the courts of the District of Columbia, 4 and cases drawn
ings of this case were overruled on appeal of a companion case, Pritchard v. Smith, 289
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961). See text at note 58 infra.
Cases decided under federal statutes may enunciate federal rules of decision as the
Barnes case did, but to a great extent state law has been used by federal courts to fill
gaps in federal enactments and to give meaning to their terms. The Federal Tort Claims
Act specifically provides that actions under it shall be governed by the law of the place
of injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964). Reference to cases decided under such federal statutes
may provide only a federal statement of a state rule. This defeats the basic consideration
served by following federal law at all-the achievement of uniform protection for federal
rights.
22 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23 See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), text at note 80 infra, a § 1983
case which relies on a pre-Erie diversity decision. Basista grew out of a fight between
a citizen who had been arrested for beating his wife, and the arresting officer. The case
was tried to a jury which returned a verdict of $1500 punitive damages. On appeal the
Third Circuit considered the proper measure of damages to apply. The applicable Penn-
sylvania rule would allow no punitive damages in the absence of actual damage but the
court held that considerations of uniformity required that a federal rule govern the issue.
The federal rule which was followed allowed the award of punitive damages alone to
stand; it was found in Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1896), a
diversity case decided under the rule in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
The resurrection of this aged precedent to justify a contemporary police brutality
damage award is incongruous. The Erie decision declared that the interpretation of
§ 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), which required
federal courts in diversity cases to give binding effect only to the statutory laws of states
and which allowed a federal common law to develop was not only unfair and ineffective
but unconstitutional. In forming its own rules of decision the federal courts invaded
rights reserved to the states by the Constitution. 304 US. 64, 78-80 (1938). The question
of whether precedents drawn from pre-Erie case law can be taken to be authoritative
after that decision has not occupied the courts. Their approach is pragmatic: where a case
allows the court to achieve a desired result it will surely be used. This choice allows the
court to operate under the federal law branch of § 1988 and avoid the more com-
plicated reference to state law or formulation of a new federal law if the state rules are
unsuited for the particular use under § 1983. If a pre-Erie decision seemed to sup-
port an outcome that a court desired to avoid, the case would surely be disregarded on
any of several possible bases: that pre-Erie rules have no precedential value today, that
the case was factually different, or that it is too old.
24 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), which relies on a case which applies the
common law as it existed in the District of Columbia. In part Pierson held a municipal
police court judge immune from suit by parties who were found guilty of violating an
ordinance that was later ruled unconstitutional. The Supreme Court made reference to
the common law strength of the doctrine of judicial immunity. The authority cited is
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), arising from the removal of an attorney
from the rolls of practice of the District of Columbia courts. The judge who issued the
removal order was held to be immune from any liability.
Since the District of Columbia is under federal jurisdiction any case decided there is
federal law. The literal reading of § 1988 requires that such federal law govern
where suitable. This should not be interpreted to mean that the decisions of the District
of Columbia courts, as federal law, are binding on all other federal courts precluding
reference to the law of the state in which they sit. When a federal court outside the
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from the areas where federal courts have felt that protection of federal
interests requires the development of a federal common law.2 5
With these diverse and extensive sources of federal law it will be
the unusual case where there is no federal case which is, or can be
made to seem, suitable to resolve a given issue under section 1983. To
fill the gaps in section 1983, some courts have been moved to dig
deeply into this mass of precedent to locate a federal rule on a par-
ticular issue. This venture, undertaken simply for the sake of being
able to use a federal law, can be time-consuming and fruitless. Nelson v.
Knox 26 demonstrates the problem. The majority and the concurring
judge agreed that when a defense of immunity was raised by municipal
officials, the federal interests in providing an effective and uniform
remedy under section 1983 were sufficient to require a federal rule.
The majority purported to find such a rule in the federal cases 7 The
concurring judge demonstrated that the cases relied on by the majority
did not in fact compel the majority ruling and that federal law could
not provide a precedent on the point. He then examined the decisions
of the state courts which did resolve the point and relied on them as
guides for the formulation of a new federal rule which compelled a
disposition similar to that of the majority28 The division in this court
could have been avoided if the majority had not felt compelled to
reach its result on the basis of federal precedent however inappropriate
it might be, but had understood that there was a role that state law
could play in the application of section 1983.
A further problem with an extensive search for federal precedent,
one avoided by the Nelson court, is that the process of finding a federal
case to cite for a particular rule or outcome may obscure the more
important consideration: are the issues raised by the case of the nature
that require a federal rule or would the application of state rules be
more satisfactory? A clear statement of the reasons for using a federal
rule can guide future decisions; a citation to an admiralty, or antitrust,
or employers liability case sheds little on the development of rules
for the protection of civil rights.
The requirement of section 1988 that federal law govern section 1983
actions insofar as it is suitable should not be interpreted too rigidly. If
District feels that the law of its own state should be used, the existence of a decision of
a District of Columbia court on the point should not be taken as controlling. Where the
matter should be governed by federal law, the decisions of the District of Columbia courts
will have precedential value equal with that of decisions of coordinate courts.
25 See note 64 infra.
26 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958).
27 Id. at 314.
28 Id. at 315, 316.
1970]
The University of Chicago Law Review
every old or factually remote federal precedent were accepted as bind-
ing on section 1983 cases then the values that are served by allowing
federal courts to apply state rules would be lost.29 State law can provide
binding rules of decision for the survival of actions and statute of limita-
tions issues.3 0 For the development of a federal common law of damages
and defenses, state law can provide guidance.31 In interpreting section
1988, emphasis should be placed on the flexibility inherent in the opera-
tive term "suitable." This will allow the federal courts to apply both
state and federal precedents depending upon which provide the appro-
priate structure of rules for applying section 1983.
II. STATE LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS
The starting point in discussion of the use of state law in federal
courts must be the Rules of Decision Act:3 2
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.
The currently authoritative interpretation of this rule is found in
Erie v. Tompkins88 and its descendants.3 4 The thrust of these cases is
29 The objection can be made only when the court feels bound by an old or factually
remote precedent. The use of such cases as expressions of rules which have been reached
by consideration of the policies involved is acceptable. For example the Supreme Court's
opinion in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), supra note 19, relied on an 1872 case which
was factually very different from Pierson. But the Court made the decision on the policy:
judges should be protected from lawsuits so they can continue "principled and fearless
decision making . 3..." 386 U.S. 547, 554. The old case is cited not because it is con-
sidered controlling but because it is a thorough exposition of the common law judicial
immunity doctrine which the Court incorporates into § 1983.
80 See text at notes 40 & 52 infra.
31 See text at note 65 infra.
32 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
33 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The holding in Erie is only binding on cases brought in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction but the policies determinative in the case have broad
implications.
But see the confused opinion in Zellner v. Wallace, 233 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1964),
a § 1983 case which held that "[w]here such a doctrine of immunity is raised by a
state official . . . the matter is controlled by state law under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins ... ." 233 F. Supp. at 877. By chance this court did conclude that judicial officials
were immune while the police were subject to suit, which is consistent with the Supreme
Court's cases on the points, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial officers immune),
and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (municipal corporations immune, police officers
subject to suit). However, the Supreme Court has apparently taken the position that
immunity is a matter of federal law; conflicting state laws are therefore not to be con-
trolling.
34 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Corp.,
556 US. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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that federal courts in deciding diversity cases should apply state law
in matters of "substance," as opposed to "procedure," so that the out-
come in federal court is similar to what would be achieved had the case
been brought in state court. As to federal question cases, including
section 1983 actions, there is language in Erie which arguably implies
that there is no power in federal courts to develop rules of decision in
the manner of common law courts.8 5 This doctrine, if applied to section
1983, would result in a choice of law formulation which would focus
on the scope of the congressional enactment. Insofar as the terms of
the statute and their interpretational gloss governed an issue, they
would control. At some point, as the issues became sufficiently remote
from those governed by the section's literal terms, the courts would
no longer be interpreting the statute but would be creating rules for
decision, and according to this interpretation of Erie the federal courts
are not competent to decide in such a manner. If the courts cannot
formulate their own rules for decisions they must look to state law.
The issues arising under section 1983 which require choice of law
analysis clearly fall in this area. The terms of section 1983 cannot pro-
vide a statute of limitations or a set of principles for measuring damages.
The statute also says nothing of defenses, giving rise to argument that
Congress meant for section 1983 to provide a form of strict liability-
that if a state official deprived a citizen of federal rights he could make
no defense of good faith, probable cause, or immunity. The courts,
however, have not been persuaded by this argument.36 The result of
these gaps in the terms of the statute, according to this interpretation
of Erie, would be that if an issue arises upon which there is no statutory
language it should be governed by the law of the state in which the
federal court sits. Thus section 1983 would develop as federal law inso-
far as the courts' decisions could be related to the terms of the statute,
but when issues arose which were completely untreated by the terms
of the statute state law would govern.
Modern interpretations of Erie and of the powers of federal courts
would reject this analysis. The presence or absence of certain language
from a statute should not be the sole criterion in a choice of law the-
ory 7 But this analysis provides a rationale in addition to the language
of section 1988 for the practice of federal courts of referring to state law.
It also explains the preference of federal courts in instances where the
terms of the statute do not resolve a particular issue for relying on
settled state law rules which are consistent with the purpose of the
federal enactment rather than explicitly announcing new federal rules.
35 304 U.S. at 78.
36 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 555 (1967) (defenses available under § 1983).
87 See text at note 64 infra.
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A practical reason for applying state law rules in federal court under
section 1983 stems from the nature of the section; it has been described
as creating a constitutional tort.38 The types of problems that have
been identified as ones upon which the statute is silent are commonly
resolved in tort litigation which for the most part is conducted in state
courts or in federal courts applying state law. Thus the greatest body
of law applicable to these issues will be found in state decisions.39
There are two ways of characterizing such reference to state law.
If a federal court is only guided by state law, then the holding of the
federal decision must take its authority from the power of the federal
courts to create rules of decision. On the other hand if the issue is said
to be controlled by state law then federal courts have not exercised a
law making power, but have only applied rules formed by state courts.
The choice between alternative formulations is of more than aca-
demic interest. If the section 1983 decisions are federal common law,
then that law must be uniform throughout the nation. If inconsisten-
cies occur as the law is developed the appellate courts will affirm and
overrule different lines of cases until there is a single system of law
throughout the nation. If on the other hand the state law controls
then the only function of appellate review will be to insure the correct-
ness of lower courts' ascertainment of the state law. Application of sec-
tion 1983 would depend upon the state law and there would be varia-
tions among the particular applications of the section from state to
state.
A. Use of State Statutes of Limitations
The most common use of state law under section 1983 has been to
provide a statute of limitations.40 This is in accordance with a settled
88 Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.
L. REv. 277 (1965).
39 This is not to say that in order for state law to provide rules of decision for § 1983
that it must bind federal courts in the same manner that the courts are obligated to
follow state rules in diversity cases. If on a given issue it is decided that it is necessary
to form a new federal rule, the court may look to any state court decision for guidance.
Once a state decision is adopted as the federal rule, it becomes part of the common law
of § 1983.
But see Belveal v. Bray, 253 F. Supp. 606 (D.C. Colo. 1966). Here the district judge
made reference to the strong federal rule favoring immunity of administrative officials.
He examined the body of state law on the problem and concluded that there was no
applicable judicial or legislative rule. Thus he concluded that the action should be con-
trolled by the federal law. This represents the converse of the normal situation where
state law fills a gap in federal precedent. The number of jurisdictions where such prob-
lems will arise is probably rather limited.
40 See generally Note, A Limitation on Action for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68
COLv~r. L. R v. 763 (1968).
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practice of federal courts; state limitation periods are applied to federal
statutes for which Congress has failed to provide a limitation.41 The
application of this general practice to the Civil Rights laws was first
accomplished in O'Sullivan v. Felix42 involving a sheriff's beating of
a black prisoner. Since this case the only issue arising in the application
of state limits is the particular period to be used. One approach, used
consistently in the Third Circuit, has been to apply the state statute
applicable to the state tort action most analogous to section 1983 claims.
In Hughes v. Smith,'4 the plaintiff sought damages for personal injury
suffered while in custody of the police. The trial court dismissed the
action as barred by the New Jersey statute of limitations for actions for
personal injury, and the court of appeals affirmed in a brief opinion.
The Second Circuit has taken a similar approach. 44
A slightly different rule was applied in the Seventh Circuit's holding
in Wakat v. Harlib.45 The court applied the residual section of the
Illinois Limitations Act which provides for a five-year limit for all
claims which are not covered by other sections. A variation on this
theme is found in Hoffman v. Wair46 where the district court held
section 1983 to be merely procedural and that once in federal court
the case became a common law action controlled by the Oregon statute
which governs common law causes. Colorado has a statute limiting
claims brought pursuant to federal law which has been specifically
applied to a section 1983 daim. 47
The reference to state law for a limitation period may be criticized
as uncertain and complex. It is doubtful that an attorney can predict
which limit will be applied to a particular cause of action unless there
has been a limitations decision on a claim arising from a similar injury.
This criticism has led to a suggestion4 s that a better approach would be
for the Supreme Court to announce in an appropriate case a statute of
limitations, or for the Court to overrule O'Sullivan v. Felix49 and apply
41 Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895), held that when Congress failed
to include a statute of limitations the courts could presume first, that there was no intent
to confer a right of action good in perpetuity and second, that Congress intended the state
statutes to govern. This rationale was reaffirmed in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946); D. Cuinu, FErE.RA COURTS 689-92 (1968).
42 233 U.S. 318 (1914). Although the case was brought under § 1985 it was interpreted
to extend the rule to § 1983.
43 389 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1968).
44 Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963).
45 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958).
46 193 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ore. 1961).
47 Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966).
48 Note, cited supra note 40.
49 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
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the federal statute of limitations for actions to recover fines or penalties
imposed by federal law.50
Either of these suggestions meets the criticisms which prompted it,
but they evidence a willingness to discard certain values that are served
by the present system. The variety of possible claims that might be
brought under section 1983 is unlimited, ranging from simple police
brutality to school desegregation cases. To impose one statute of limita-
tions for actions so diverse would be to disregard the unanimous judg-
ment of the states that periods of limitations should vary with the
subject matter of the claim. While the present system of reference to
these many state limits is not perfect in operation, it surely preserves
some of the judgments that have been made about what appropriate
periods of limitation should be for causes of action diverse in nature.
While the uncertainty problem may loom large when the mass of section
1983 cases involving statutes of limitations are examined, from the
perspective of the individual practitioner familiar with the limitation
rules of his jurisdiction the problem may not be so severe. He is fa-
miliar with the limits imposed by his state as to actions for damage to
person, property, or whatever distinctions his particular state draws.
These statutes are more accessible to the profession than a limitation
contained in a Supreme Court decision which would apply to only one
section of the United States Code. Use of the limit on recovery of fines
and penalties with section 1983 is also objectionable; since this would
be contrary to the settled practice under most federal statutes which
fail to provide a statute of limitations, it might therefore be the source
of considerable confusion.
Another problem with having a unique federal limit is the danger
of forum shopping, an inherent possibility in any difference between
the law as applied in federal and state courts. In the context of section
1983, litigation in federal court is not a danger, but the object of the
section. However the statutes of limitations are not the sort of deficien-
cies in state law that section 1983 was meant to remedy. Were there to
be a unique federal limitations period, a claim against arresting officers
might be barred by a state statute on batteries, but the same claim
framed as a deprivation of due process might be permitted under fed-
eral law.51 As long as the present rules prevent litigation in federal
court simply to take advantage of a longer limitations period, they
should be preserved. State statutes of limitations should be applied to
section 1983 claims.
5O 28 U.s.C. § 2462 (1964).
51 However, § 1983 relief would be appropriate if a state limitations period for
actions against state officials were so unreasonably short that it impinged on federal rights.
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B. Use of State Survival of Action Rules
The other major area for the use of state law has been to allow sur-
vival of actions.52 As late as 1955 "[t]he question of survival of actions
under section 1983 . . . ha[d] apparently never been adjudicated." 53
The apparent absence of litigation on this issue reflects the narrow
judicial construction placed upon section 1983 in the years shortly after
its passage.54 By 1961 the section had become a source of sufficient litiga-
tion to produce two circuit court cases which held that section 1983
actions could survive the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.
Brazier v. Cherry55 arose from the beating death of a police prisoner.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion is exceptional in its total reliance on section
1988.
Thus section 1988 declares a simple, direct abbreviated test:
what is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make
the civil rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that
inquiry is then matched against (a) federal law and if it is
found wanting the court must look to (b) state law currently
in effect.5 6
The court applied its test, found no federal law, and then held that the
Georgia survival of actions law governed.51 In Pritchard v. Smith58 the
defendant police chief died during the litigation. After discussion of
various federal rules allowing survival of the action,5 9 the court based
its holding on the survival right provided by Arkansas law as incor-
52 See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1153 (1963); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 25(d)(a) which
provides: "When a public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity and during
its pendency dies . . . the action does not abate and his successor is automatically sub-
stituted as a party .... " This section allows most injunctive actions to survive but in
many tort claims seeking compensation for past injury the rule would be of little aid
because the government official has acted beyond his official capacity in inflicting the
injury. No case has been found where the rule was relied on to allow survival under
§ 1983.
53 Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
54 See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MRC.
L. R v. 1323 (1952). Every'section of the post Civil War Civil Rights laws, except § 1983
and its criminal analog, suffered debilitating restrictions in Supreme Court decisions.
These two sections survived albeit in narrower form than today because their "under
color" of state law requirement was interpreted to meet the "state action" requirement.
55 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
56 Id. at 409.
57 Id.
58 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
59 See text at note 17 supra.
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porated into section 1983 by section 1988.0 Other courts have similar
results relying on section 1988.61
The problem of allowing section 1983 actions to survive presents
the most attractive situation for the application of state law. The state
law on the point is generally comprehensive so the federal court will
be much more likely to find a controlling statute or similar case there
than in federal law. State law will be applied in a positive sense-it will
permit the application of the federal remedy.
Both of these issues which should be controlled by state law-the
statute of limitations and survival of the action-present unique con-
siderations. The practice of using state limitation periods under section
1983 is only a specific use of a general federal rule. The survival of
actions issue is resolved by state law because this is a path of least resis-
tance-it provides a relevant positive answer. These two rules of refer-
ence to state law for controlling precedent should be limited to the
issues they resolve. They should not be taken to imply a similar choice
of law for damage and defense issues. The former issues are not so
directly related to the scope or definition of federal rights as the latter.
Inquiry into the meaning of due process cannot elucidate the questions
raised by a stale claim or a dead party in the same way it can indicate
an appropriate resolution for the question of a police officer's immunity
or the extent of liability of a state employer who dismisses a teacher
thereby infringing on his freedom of speech.62 These latter issues are
closely related to, if not identical with, the definition of federal rights.
The former govern the operation of the judicial process. It is proper,
therefore, that with respect to the statute of limitations and the survival
of the action, the considerations of using a modern and comprehensive
body of state law should outweigh the consideration of defining the
scope of federal rights uniformly throughout the nation. The next sec-
tion considers the development of a federal common law of damages
and defenses where the considerations of uniformity are dominant.
III. A FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF DAMAGES AND DEFENSES UNDER
SECrION 1983
Earlier discussion of the Erie doctrine indicated that reliance on
state law where federal enactments are silent has been justified by
60 289 F.2d at 158.
61 Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966); Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp.
930 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
62 An example of the broad protection afforded federal rights under § 1983 is
Keefe v. Geanakos, 818 F.2d 859 (1st Cir. 1969). Here plaintiff was dismissed from his
position as a high school teacher for using the word "motherfucker" in class. The court
held that such dismissal infringed the plaintiff's free speech rights when the school library
contained five books which included that word.
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the argument that the federal courts are not empowered to create rules
of decision. 63 It is now generally accepted that there are substantial
exceptions to this rule; federal courts will develop rules of decision
to govern areas of particular federal concern.64 It can be argued that the
protection of federal civil rights as defined in the Constitution and
laws of the United States is one of these areas; that the effect of the
fourteenth amendment was to commit to Congress the power and
responsibility to regulate exercise of civil rights in the nation; and
that section 1983 and the related sections constitute a grant of juris-
diction to the federal courts which supports the development of rules
of decision sufficient to carry out the purposes of the civil rights law.
This theory would require federal courts to enunciate federal rules to
govern the problems identified as untreated by the terms of the statute,
and to the extent these rules were enunciated by higher federal courts
they would be binding in all cases and would apply regardless of con-
flicting state rules on the points.
This analysis supports the approach which the Supreme Court has
apparently taken to the questions of damages and defenses. There has
been no explicit mention that a choice of law problem exists at all.
Instead the Court has announced its rules regarding defenses in section
1983 cases on the basis of both state and federal authorities without
indicating that either body of law is controlling.65 Language in Monroe
may have been meant to indicate this: "[section 1983] should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his actions." 66 In context this statement
rejected a defense by a police officer that since he had no specific intent
to deprive plaintiff of his federal rights he could not be held liable
under section 1983. The operative part of the sentence is therefore the
language concerning responsibility for the natural consequences of the
actions taken. However the initial clause of the sentence has been read
by lower courts to hold that general rules of tort law are applicable to
section 1983 actions. Such a formulation is completely permissive, al-
lowing the federal courts to utilize state, federal, or commentators'
63 See text at note 35 supra.
64 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383 (1964). Among the areas where federal courts are developing a common law
Friendly lists interstate disputes, some national banking practices, government contract
law, labor contract law, unfair competition, regulation of interstate carriers, and defama-
tion by multi-state media. 39 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 383, 408-18.
65 Pierson v. Ray, 886 U.S. 547 (1967), relied on a federal precedent to resolve the issue
of judicial immunity and secondary authority supported by a diversity case decided on
Missouri law to indicate that a police officer may raise a defense of good faith and prob-
able cause.
66 865 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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statements of the appropriate general rule.67 With this system the stan-
dard of choice is simply, if somewhat indefinitely, the achievement of
the purposes of section 1983 as applied to the given factual situation.
Decisions made in this manner will form rules of a federal common law
of application of section 1983.
The virtue of this system is its flexibility and non-restrictive nature;
it provides an opportunity for federal courts to develop a uniform set
of rules for damages, defenses, or other issues if it is extended. Its
undesirable aspect is uncertainty. Already the Monroe statement about
the general background of tort liability has led the Fifth Circuit to
apply state law which the Supreme Court held to be inapplicable. The
court of appeals opinion in Pierson v. Ray68 followed the law of
Mississippi, the place of the injury, holding consent to an injury to be
a defense to a tort claim under section 1983.69 The Supreme Court
held that this defense was not available under section 1983, regardless
of state law, and it allowed plaintiffs to continue their suit, relying
on a secondary authority and a diversity case which applied Missouri
law. The Fifth Circuit's error arose from the difficulty in ascertaining
that the purposes and policies of section 1983 excluded a defense
based on the plaintiff's consent.70
The Court's latest word on these problems is Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc 1 This case arose under section 198272 which guarantees
67 In 1963 the Supreme Court denied certiorari to an appeal from a Fifth Circuit judg-
ment, which contained instructions to the district court on remand to apply general rules
of law. Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, rehearing denied, 319 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1963). The case instructed the lower court that "[i]n connecting the
acts with the Defendants (causation problem), civil liability for money damages of the
respective Defendants would depend on traditional tort principles," 318 F.2d at 125, and
"[the elements of a § 1983 cause of action] may well partake substantially of tradi-
tional general tort law to bring in elements akin to want of probable cause, or malice,
or both." 318 F.2d at 126. See also Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.
1964) (§ 1988 requires federal courts to use the best combination of state and federal
law to vindicate civil rights).
68 852 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).
69 Id. at 220.
70 The Fifth Circuit has taken the Supreme Court's approach to choice of law ques-
tions under § 1983 to heart. In Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), a sheriff
was faced with a § 1983 claim based on detention of a prisoner after the charges
had been dismissed. The officer defended on grounds of good faith and absence of intent
-the failure to release the prisoner arose from a clerical error. The Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's finding for the defendant and remanded with instructions to enter a
directed verdict for plaintiff. In marked contrast to their systematic approach in Pierson
of applying the law of the state, the Fifth Circuit supported its holding with citations to
a diversity tort case, a case from the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and Am. Jur. 2d. 407 F.2d at 792.
71 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27) ("the Civil Rights Act of 1866').
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all citizens the same rights enjoyed by white citizens in transactions
involving real property. Like section 1983 this law is very brief but it
can be extended to include a broad range of conduct. The same prob-
lem, lack of express terms to govern certain basic issues of application
of the law, which arises under section 1983 is also present in section
1982. In Sullivan the Supreme Court considered what law should mea-
sure damages to be awarded for a community recreation club's racially
motivated refusal to allow a black sub-lessee in the community to par-
ticipate in the use of the recreation facilities:
This means, as we read § 1988, that both federal and state
rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the
policies expressed in federal statutes. Cf. Brazier v. Cherry,
293 F.2d 401. The rule of damages, whether drawn from fed-
eral or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need
whenever a federal right is impaired.7 3
This statement constitutes a clear directive to the federal courts on
the measure of damages issue, and it will certainly be interpreted to
hold that section 1988 opens the way for any precedent to govern any
issue in these civil rights cases insofar as it comports with the judge's
view of the "policies" of the statute. Since section 1988 applies with
equal force to section 1983, this statement can be taken to make ex-
plicit what was hinted in Monroe.7 4
There are reasons to limit the Sullivan case to the damage issue.
Federal courts have traditionally been willing to shape remedies neces-
sary to effectuate the policies expressed in federal statutes. This has
been done in areas as divergent as the protection of constitutional
rights75 and the protection of investors.7 6 Sullivan relies on this line of
authority as well as on section 1988. Thus the case might be limited
as dealing only with an application of a general federal damage rule
in much the same manner that the rule of reference to state law for
statutes of limitations was limited. However, when read with the
Monroe and Pierson approaches to issues of necessary intent and other
defenses, this restriction of Sullivan is unlikely.
The acceptance of the proposition that federal courts may refer to
any precedent which they believe effectuates the policies and purposes
of section 1983 makes the practical choice of law problem more difficult.
Where formerly there was a possibility that the Erie analysis might
require the use of state law in certain applications of section 1983, the
73 896 U.S. 229, 240 (1969).
74 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See text at note 66 supra.
75 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
76 JJ. Case Co. v. Borak, 877 U.S. 426 (1964).
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federal courts are now directed to develop a comprehensive common
law of damages and defenses. Recalling the Supreme Court's purposes
for section 1983 as stated in Monroe1 7 it is clear that the development
of part of this common law will be easier than development of the re-
mainder. If a claim under section 1983 is merely a federal formulation
of a cause of action that could have been remedied under state law, the
federal remedy can at least provide that remedy. This occurred in
Cobb v. City of Maldens where a class of schoolteachers claimed they
were wrongly dismissed from their positions. The court agreed but
found no applicable federal rule as to the limits of liability for breach
of contract and concluded that "[i]n the absence of any clear authority
on this point, we are of the opinion that the Massachusetts law in this
regard properly defines the limits of liability which Congress in-
tended." 79 Similarly in cases where relief is technically, but not prac-
tically, available under state law, section 1983 can at least remedy the
injury to the extent the state law provides. These state rules can be
adopted by federal courts and become part of the federal common law
subject to the unifying forces that work in the appellate process.
Monroe also requires that relief under section 1983 be extended
where the state law is found to be deficient. If federal rights include
protection against the particular injury suffered, and no relief is pro-
vided by state law, then development of federal common law is neces-
sary. Basista v. Weir,80 arising out of a police officer's battery of an ar-
rested citizen, is an example of such development. Under the circum-
stances of the case Pennsylvania, the state of the injury, would have
compensated the victim only for his actual damages. The case came to
the Third Circuit in the posture that only punitive damages had been
awarded in federal court below. In this situation the court went be-
yond the relief provided by state law and allowed the award of punitive
damages alone to stand.81 The difficult problem for the courts is deter-
mining when section 1983 should only parallel state law and when it
should take the Basista step of extending remedies. 2 Monroe tells us
only that section 1983 can provide all remedies available under the
77 365 U.S. 167, 173, 174, 183 (1961). See text at note 15 supra.
78 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
79 Id. at 703.
80 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), supra note 23.
81 Id. at 87.
82 As to the measure of damages for deprivation of first amendment rights there is a
total absence of decisions, probably because these rights are usually unrelated to profit-
making endeavors and in any case it is difficult to show monetary damages flowing from
their deprivation. The nature of these damages, if they can be proven in future cases, are
identical with the definition of the first amendment right itself which indicates that if
damage law is developed at all it should be developed in federal courts. ,
[Vol. 37:494
Choice of Law under Section 1983
state law and that it can go beyond these remedies, but it does not give
any indication where the former remedies are sufficient and where the
additional common law developments are necessary.
The final purpose of section 1983 is to override unconstitutional
state laws. This does not add anything to federal law since the rights
expressed in the Constitution and laws of the United States will be
given effect through the supremacy clause when there is conflict with
state law.83 To effectuate this purpose, conflicting state laws will be
disregarded; otherwise section 1983 remedies will be restricted to those
which state law provides, or those about which the state law was silent.
In Jobson v. Henne 4 employees of a state mental institution sought
to raise a defense of official immunity to a charge that they had sub-
jected a mental defective to, inter alia, slavery. The Second Circuit
observed that:
To hold that all state officials in suits brought under § 1983
enjoy an immunity similar to that they might enjoy in suits
under state law "would practically constitute a judicial repeal
of the Civil Rights Acts." Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280,
300 (9th Cir. 1959).85
In disregarding the state immunity law the court extended protection
of the plaintiff's federal right beyond that which was provided under
state law. The difficult problem here for the courts is determining when
state law does not infringe on federal rights and when the state law, if
applied, would cause such infringement. In the former area federal
rights simply do not extend so far as to protect citizens from such
conduct by state officials 6 while in the latter area the federal common
83 US. CONsr. art. VI, § 2. The same point has been made about § 1983 as a whole-
that it adds nothing substantive to federal law but merely makes explicit what is implied
by the existence of federal rights. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), implies that such a
right of damages is implicit in federal protection of rights. If this view is accepted
§ 1983 becomes merely a jurisdictional grant. See Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1956). The implications of this proposition are of little practical significance: whether
courts regard § 1983 as creating a right of civil action or as a jurisdictional grant, they
must still face the question of formulating adequate rules of decision.
84 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
85 Id. at 133.
But see Charlton v. City of Hialeah, 188 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1951), which accepted
Florida law as governing municipal immunity without considering whether there was an
alternative choice. This holding denied a jailed motorist the opportunity to present a
case for wrongful imprisonment.
86 Corbean v. Board of Educ., 366 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1041 (1967). This plaintiff was injured on public school property and brought a tort
action in state court which was dismissed on the Ohio rules of governmental immunity.
Then plaintiff sought to challenge this immunity in federal court as a deprivation of
constitutional rights. The argument was rejected on grounds that there was no conflict
between the Ohio immunity rule and federal rights.
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law remedies must be developed to provide relief from deprivations
infficted by officials engaged in officially sanctioned conduct. This
development will complement the extension of federal remedies into
areas where state law was merely deficient.
This analysis indicates that formulation of damage and defense rules
under section 1983 ultimately becomes an inquiry into the definition
of the rights protected by federal law. Insofar as state law protects
such rights, it can be adopted by federal courts to provide substantially
similar relief. When it is decided that the federal right extends beyond
the protection afforded by state law, the federal courts will shape their
remedies to protect the rights. In either case, the necessity for uniform
definition of federal rights requires that the defenses and measure of
damages rules which are bound up with the definition also be uniform.
This requires the development of a federal common law.
CONCLUSION
The issues which raise choice of law questions-statute of limitations,
survival of actions, measure of damages, and defenses-can be separated
into two categories. The statute of limitations and the survival of ac-
tions generally bear only a peripheral relationship to the scope and
definition of federal rights and state law provides reasonable and admin-
istrable rules to resolve these issues. They should be governed by state
law. The remaining issues are bound up with the definition of the
extent of the federal rights and should be resolved by rules of federal
common law87 pursuant to the power inherent in federal courts to de-
fine the Constitution and laws of the United States and power delegated
to the federal courts by the fourteenth amendment and section 1983.
The distinction between these categories is imperfect. It is easy to
imagine that a state might have an extremely short statute of limitations
for actions against police officers and that the adoption of it would
constitute an infringement of the scope of federal rights. The distinc-
tion can serve, however, to guide the initial inquiries as to the choice
of precedent and to give some idea of the types of issues that are proper
for state or federal law.
87 A brief summary of this common law can be suggested at this point. § 1983 ap-
parently creates liability for all state officials, excepting judges, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 553 (1967), for deprivation of federal rights. Malice is not an element of the cause
of action, Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1969), although malice may impose
liability for what would otherwise have been a lawful arrest, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553 (1967). Executive officers are not immune, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), but
they are not liable when they have made reasonable errors while acting within the scope
of their jurisdiction, Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9th Cir. 1959).
